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Assessment of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and the
Necessity of a Deeper Collaboration with the Social
Sciences for Racial Equality
Carta H. Robison*
INTRODUCTION
Author and journalist Hunter S. Thompson once
wrote, “I’m a relatively respectable citizen a multiple,
felon, perhaps, but certainly not dangerous.”1 AngloAmerican jurisprudence presents a very unique set of
procedural rules, many codified through common law,
which have guided our American legal system for several
decades.2 The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in
1975.3 They apply to actions, cases, and proceedings
brought after the Rules took effect.4 The purpose of these
Rules is to “administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining
the truth and securing a just determination.”5 Consistent
with this provision, the Federal Rules of Evidence
mandate that all relevant evidence is admissible unless
the Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of
Evidence themselves, or any other rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court provide otherwise.6
Challengingly, however, the Federal Rules of
Evidence reflect two principalistic issues that do not
always live in accord in the criminal context.7 Through
* The author completed her juris doctor degree from Indiana University
Maurer School of Law. She thanks her parents for their support and
encouragement, Professor Victor D. Quintanilla for opening her eyes to the
realities of “access to justice” in the American legal system, and her
colleagues on the INDIANA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY for their fine
editing and comments on this article. All correspondence about this article
should be directed to her at cartarobison@gmail.com.
1 HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS: A SAVAGE JOURNEY
TO THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN DREAM, 74 (Vintage Books 2d ed. 1998).
2 See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining
and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255 (1984)
(discussing codification of the law of evidence).
3 Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
4 FED. R. EVID. 101.
5 FED. R. EVID. 102.
6 FED. R. EVID. 402.
7 See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635 (2003) (discussing the
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the most foundational of principles in our jurisprudence
system, the Accused is innocent until proven guilty in
criminal prosecutions. This is known as the “presumption
of innocence” and exists today under our common-law
legal system.8 The text of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides several
guarantees to the Accused, including the right to a speedy
and public trial in front of an impartial jury, to be
informed of the accusation against him, to confront the
witnesses against him, and to call witnesses in his favor.9
Because the Accused possesses this inherent presumption
of innocence, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each essential element of the crime
charged. The notion, in theory, is that we base our
criminal-justice system on the precept that a person will
be convicted only for what he does, not for who he is or for
what he has done prior to the event in question.10
One hallmark rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence
has codified this notion with particularity: that evidence
of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible
to prove that at a given time the person acted in
accordance with that character.11 Character, in this sense,
is roughly the equivalent of what people think the kind of
person someone is; it is “a fixed trait or the sum of
traits.”12 This is known as character propensity, and
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 prohibits use of such
evidence. Therefore, on one hand, the rules are designed
to provide relevant information to the trier of fact (judge
or jury), but through rules such as Rule 404 and its
propensity ban, certain information may be limited when
it is likely to be given too much weight by the trier of
fact.13
inconsistencies between Rules 609 and 608(b) and their respective
impeachment methods and the disparities that result in their application).
8 See generally François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in
the French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
107(2010) (discussing the development of the presumption of innocence
doctrine in both the French and Anglo-American traditions).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10 H. Richard Uvillers, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion,
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 (1982).
11 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
12 IA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 55, ILL. L. REV. (Tillers
Rev. 1983).
13 Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 534 (1992).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 609 is known to be the
most controversial of all the rules.14 Many scholars in
opposition of the rule have suggested that there be more
restrictions on use of a defendant’s criminal convictions to
impeach a defendant’s credibility.15 Social-science
research has enhanced support for the fact that
admissibility of prior bad acts can significantly prejudice
the defendant. Furthermore, there is more room for social
science and critical race theory to play a role in legal
policy assessment and in the development of policy to
reflect the status of racism in the American jurisprudence
system than has been accepted.
Triers of fact apply Federal Rule of Evidence Rule
609 under the assumption that the rule is neutral. This
Note will explain that the rule is not neutral and should
be reviewed to account for the racial inequality in the
criminal justice system: Black men face more criminal
convictions than any other demographic.16 More
specifically, this note links critical race theory, social
science methods, and the law, to intervene and address
how the use of Rule 609 disproportionately affects people
of color. Rule 609 permits exposure of a witness’s prior
conviction when those convictions are the result of being
swept into a system that is biased towards them. A
stricter scrutiny of the reliability of the prior conviction as
a result of systemic racism must be acknowledged.17 A
collaboration with social science is the best intervention.

See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 295 (2008); Teree E. Foster, 609(a) in the Civil
Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1988)
(noting the commentary around 609 as challenging and profuse); Victor Gold,
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of
Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295 (1994) (noting that no Federal Rule
of Evidence has sparked more controversy than Rule 609).
15 Okun, supra note 13, at 536.
16 Despite the recommendation of The Chicago Manual of Style, I have
intentionally capitalized the “b” in Black. Historically, “Black” constitutes a
group which includes African-Americans and those who are of African
descent but not from the United States. Capitalizing “Black” is also the
accepted standard used by Black media outlets and shows respect for the
necessary distinction between color and race. For additional commentary, see
Lori L. Tharps, Opinion, The Case for Black with a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-forblack-with-a-capital-b.html?_r=0.
17 Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563,
565 (2014).
14
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This Note proposes that a stricter focus on
behavioral realism in the law will take into account the
scientific findings of bias and systemic racism and use
them to understand how people’s (including judges’)
subconscious biases affect their behavior in the operation
of Rule 609. With this information, lawmakers can craft
policies to address current discrimination and reform the
rules beginning with Rule 609. Ultimately, this Note will
show that Rule 609, as it stands today, re-manifests
discrimination in the justice system whereby the prior
conviction helps convict the defendant again, and that
social science should be applied more forcefully to show
that bias plays a major role in perpetuating racism in the
law. As the most controversial of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Rule 609 is best suited to lead the charge for
criminal-justice reform. Application of Rule 609 severely
prejudices the defendant-witness. The legal system
should be accountable for approaches in the law that have
been invalidated by the social sciences. This article calls
for implementation of a federal interdisciplinary task
force to follow the model proposed by Jerry Kang:
deconstruct Rule 609, apply behavior realism, and reform
the law to reflect scientific findings.18
I.

THE HISTORICAL AND RACIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
RULE 609

There have been several iterations and
reconstructions of what is now Rule 609 since 1970.19 In
1965, the courts initiated complete judicial discretion and
balancing tests where the judge could use her discretion
to weigh the probative value of the conviction against the
issue of the witness’s credibility.20 This was short lived,
however, because by 1970 Congress rejected the balancing
test when it amended the District of Columbia Code to
mandate the admissibility of a felony conviction for any
See Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism
about Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627, 635–36 (2015) (arguing that the
commitment to behavioral realism is a three-step process: step one, identify
new science; step 2, excavate old law; and step 3, account for the gap).
19 See Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 271 (1973).
20 See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d. 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that trial
courts should employ a balancing test to determine whether to admit prior
convictions in order to impeach a witness).
18
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crime involving dishonesty or a false statement.21
Congress’s desire to use prior convictions against a
witness was taking a strong hold, and judges were quickly
becoming restricted in the discretion they could use.22 The
Rule 609 of today is a product of this amendment to the
D.C. Code. It was a bargain between two conflicting draft
versions of the rule produced by both the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees in 1975.23 Each version
varied drastically.24 The Conference Committee was
tasked with reconciling the two versions.25 While Rule 609
was an attempt to strike a balance between the necessity
of prior-conviction evidence and the defendant’s right to a
fair trial, it became clear that those who favored greater
admission of prior-conviction evidence got the better end
of the compromise.26
The crux of Rule 609 is as follows: once the
defendant-witness takes the stand, he opens himself up to
impeachment for credibility by the prosecutor, who may
(and often will) introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior
convictions.27 Rule 609 is only triggered when there is a
conviction and the defendant-witness takes the stand.28
The rule’s design encompasses two parts. The first, and
most straightforward part, is Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(2), which seeks to admit conviction evidence for
crimes involving dishonesty or a false statement (e.g.
perjury, tax evasion, forgery, embezzlement).29 If such a
conviction exists, and the conviction was in the last ten
Okun, supra note 13, at 541 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 14–305(b)(1) (1980))
(“For the purpose of attacking credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted . . . if the
criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved
dishonesty or a false statement regardless of punishment.”).
22 See Alan D. Hornstein, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to
Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997); see
also Gold, supra note 14, at 2299 (discussing the history of Rule 609 and
criticism around the Preliminary Draft’s absence of any discretion to exclude
the threat of prejudice in a criminal case).
23 Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A
Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L.
REV. 1, 10 (1999).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See Edward Roslak, Game Over: A Proposal to Reform Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, 39 SETON HALL L. REV., 695, 716 (2009).
28 Id. at 695.
29 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
21
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years, then it must automatically be admitted.30 This also
means that the judge exercises no discretion on whether
such evidence should be admitted, and its admission is
not subject to the Rule 403 balancing.31 The thought is
that because these convictions involve “dishonestly or
false statements” they are highly probative of untruthful
character.32 The rule does not distinguish between
felonies or misdemeanors.33
The second part, Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(1), is slightly more complex and involves evidence
for crimes punishable for more than one year that do not
involve a false statement or dishonesty. In other words,
Rule 609(a)(1) admits other serious crimes through one of
two balancing tests. Rule 609(a)(1)(A) indicates that
evidence must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil
or criminal case where the witness was not the
defendant.34 Rule 609(a)(1)(B) states that evidence must
be admitted where the witness was also the defendant if
the probative value outweighs prejudicial effect.35 Finally,
Rule 609(b) caps the look-back period of a conviction at
ten years.36 After ten years, the law favors exclusion of
the evidence. If more than ten years have passed from a
witness’s conviction or release (whichever is later) and the
impeachment would be otherwise admissible under Rule
See id.; Gold, supra note 14, at 2319.
See FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 is a balancing test for judges to determine
whether the evidence introduced has probative value. If the evidence passes
Rule 401’s relevancy standard then the judge determines whether the
evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of one of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
When that probative value is outweighed, the judge may exclude the
evidence; see also Gold, supra note 14, at 2319 (describing that evidence
admitted under (a)(2) is not subject to exclusion, even where prejudicial effect
outweighs probative value).
32 Gold, supra note 14, at 2319-2320.
33 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (noting that the rule applies to any crime
regardless of the punishment).
34 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A).
35 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). This is a modified (reverse) version of Rule 403
where the law favors exclusion: the probative value of the evidence must
outweigh the prejudicial effect to the defendant. This balancing test is
designed to account for the prejudice the criminal defendant faces when the
jury learns of such conviction. For all other witnesses, the original Rule 403
balance applies and favors inclusion of evidence.
36 See FED. R. EVID. 609(b). This subdivision applies if more than 10 years
have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it,
whichever is greater.
30
31
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609(a), then an extremely strong showing of probative
value is required to admit conviction evidence.37
Admitting evidence to the trier of fact that could be
attributed too much weight is dangerous for several
reasons. To start, it is important to first note why the
Federal Rules of Evidence exist in the first place. Some
scholars have posited that juries are the reason why such
extensive rules exist.38 The problem with juries is
illustrated through the concept of “mental contamination”
and it comes up frequently in evidence law.39 Juries are
lay people, not legal scholars, and they bear the heavy
burden of sifting through a lot of information and
deciding, based on the facts presented in the case,
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crimes
charged. But mental contamination represents a category
of research findings about how juries use prior knowledge
(and bias) in an unwanted manner.40 From the start, the
judge must be the gatekeeper of the flow of evidence and
information presented to the jury to reduce the bias and
prejudice that the jury may exert against the defendant.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, discussed previously, is one
such rule that requires the judge to make swift
determinations on how the jury will be affected by
admission of the information.41 Human behavior indicates
that people rely on character and the assumption is that
people behave according to their personality or
character.42
Character or a character trait is normally proven
by one of three available means: reputation, specific
manifestation, and sometimes opinion.43 Culturally, most
Americans assume that one’s personality (or “character”)
has a strong bearing on one’s propensity to behave in a
certain way towards others.44 In other words, Americans
like to believe that if they understand a person’s
See FED. R. EVID. 609(b)(1); see also Rule of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 271 (1973) (stating that “practical
considerations of fairness and relevancy demand that some boundary be
recognized”).
38 See MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 2 (2016).
39 Id. at 19.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 57.
42 Id. at 142.
43 Uvillers, supra note 10, at 849.
44SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 142.
37
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personality traits, then it may be easier to predict that
person’s behavior on a given occasion. The question then
becomes: under this assumption, is it proper for the law to
exclude evidence of a person’s character to determine
whether a criminal defendant is more or less likely to
have committed the crime charged? The response of the
common law is “yes and no.”45 The American criminaljustice system has developed to exclude evidence of a
person’s character to prove that a defendant has a
propensity to commit crime.46 By contrast, there is no
prohibition on use of prior-conviction evidence to impeach
a defendant’s credibility as a witness.47
Second, character evidence is generally excluded
because it is of slight probative value.48 Character
evidence is thought to be time consuming and
distracting.49 At worst, as the Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 404 note, character evidence is very prejudicial: it
“distracts the trier of fact from the main question of what
actually happened on the particular occasion” and
“punish[es] the bad man . . . despite what the evidence in
the case shows actually happened.”50 On a psychological
level, jurors misuse negative character evidence.51
Further, when character is introduced, and the
prosecution is able to probe into specific instances of the
witness’s character, the jury is more likely to find the
defendant guilty “when positive character evidence is
rebutted than when character evidence is not introduced
at all.”52 Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence were
established to restrain lawyers from presenting unreliable
evidence that would confuse, mislead, deceive the jury, or

Uvillers, supra note 10, at 849.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
47 See generally, FED. R. EVID. 609.
48 Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
219 (1973).
49 See id; see also Uvillers, supra note 10, at 850.
50 Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
219 (1973).
51 See Evelyn M. Mader & Jennifer S. Hunt, Talking About a Black Man: The
Influence of Defendant and Character Witness Race on Jurors’ Use of
Character Evidence, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 608, 609 (2011) (analyzing studies that
found that jurors are more influenced by specific negative information from
the prosecution’s cross examination than the general positive character
evidence introduced by the defense).
52 Id. at 610.
45
46
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be too prejudicial to a criminal defendant.53 The law
assumes that people do not dependably behave in
accordance with their personalities, so as a general rule
character evidence is excluded.54
The lines of character evidence begin to blur as the
litigious evidence battle continues with the complexity of
rules such as Rule 609. Rule 609 is an exception to Rule
404’s ban against character evidence.55 Courts allow
character evidence under certain circumstances and for
certain purposes.56 But, as is the case for Rule 609, once
prior-conviction evidence is admitted, the jury cannot
unhear it. Prior-conviction evidence is still used even
though there is an overwhelming body of data that
concludes that jurors outright misuse prior-conviction
evidence.57 The jurors draw impermissible inferences—so
much so that Rule 609 creates an entirely opposite
effect!58 It has been proven that jurors cannot manage
evidence of a person’s prior convictions: they use priorconviction evidence to infer criminal propensity and
frequently ignore or fail to understand limiting
instructions.59 The drafters made two very large
assumptions: 1) that jurors are able to understand a
judge’s limiting instruction when prior-conviction
evidence is introduced; and 2) that jurors will obey the
instruction.60 Thus, in theory, the rules were designed to
help jurors by limiting the amount of prejudicial evidence
that is presented, but instead the rules allow introduction
of evidence that the jury cannot objectively handle.
Coupled with other psychological processes, such as
implicit bias and stereotyping, “[w]hite jurors are more
likely to experience anger and less likely to report
empathy toward the defendant,” seeing them as vicious

T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 501
(1999).
54 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 143; see generally FED. R. EVID. 404.
55 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3). Evidence of a witness’s character may be
admissible under Rules 607, 608, and 609. Emphasis added.
56 Id.
57 Dodson, supra note 23, at 42.
58 See id. at 32 (discussing one of the first relevant studies regarding jurors
and limiting instructions).
59 Id. at 39 (“[T]he defendant’s criminal record does not affect the defendant’s
credibility, but does increase the likelihood of conviction, and the judge’s
limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error.”).
60 Id. at 31.
53
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and dangerous.61 Under Rule 609, this level of prejudice
leads to re-conviction and increases racial disparities in
the criminal justice system.62
Psychology and evidence law enjoy a unique
intersection because psychological rationales have been
presented in support of many of the rules seen today.
Naturally, the story of the Federal Rules of Evidence
begins with rulemakers, those who design and continue to
shape the rules. At one point, rulemakers were commonlaw judges, but today they are legislatures, committees,
and often judges in their role as interpreters of the
rules.63 Within the universe of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, there are judges who apply the rules, parties to
cases, lawyers who argue how the rules should be applied,
witnesses, and jurors. Undergirding the application of the
rules of evidence is, unavoidably, psychology.64 Arguably,
the rulemakers must act as psychologists.65 The rules
require factfinders to comprehend the meaning of
evidence, assess its soundness, ascertain whether certain
kinds of inquiries by counsel are likely to help illuminate
the strengths and weaknesses of evidence, and to
determine whether judicial instructions can provide
guidance when confronting problematic evidence.66 In the
end, “rulemakers must predict how a given kind of
evidence . . . is likely to influence factfinders, steering
them away from misleading factual conclusions and
moving them towards correct ones.”67 Similarly, when a
judge rules on whether to admit or exclude a piece of
evidence, she is doing so by predicting how a jury will be
influenced by it.68 Unfortunately, the rulemakers have
simply gotten this wrong when it comes to Rule 609.
Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 269, 280 (2015).
62 See Montré D. Carodine, The Mis-Characterization of the Negro: A Race
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 550
(2009).
63 Cf. Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 185 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing that the Supreme Court
is a “merely a conduit” to those who wrote the Rules and is not qualified
enough to “apprise their merits when applied in actual practice.”)
64 See Eilis S. Magner, Wigmore Confronts Munsterberg: Present Relevance of
a Classic Debate, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 121, 122 (1991).
65 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 1.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2.
68 See Reagan Wm. Simpson & Warren S. Huang, Procedural Rules
Governing the Admissibility of Evidence, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 513, 521 (2001).
61
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The premises on which many of the Federal Rules
of Evidence are constructed are largely a product of the
rulemakers’ perceptions and beliefs about human
psychology: how people receive, store, and retrieve
information, as well as how they draw inferences.69
Consider, for example, the evidence law concept of
“hearsay.” Hearsay is broadly defined as an out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted.70
Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because it
is like offering secondhand testimony without the
statement’s declarant in court to attest to its truth.71
Remarkably, a savvy lawyer may be able to admit such a
statement under the nearly thirty exceptions to the
hearsay rule.72 For example, under Rule 803(2), an out-ofcourt statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted may be admissible when the statement is made
under the influence of a stressful event.73 Rule 803(2) is
known as the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay
rule.74 It is rooted in the belief that people have limited
cognitive capacity and that the stress of an arousing event
creates so much excitement that people lack sufficient
capacity of reflection to create falsehoods.75 This rule,
grounded in cognitive theory, dates back to the early
twentieth-century and was accepted as sound by
American judges and later the drafters of the Federal
Rules.76 Therefore, if rulemakers and judges are using
these social beliefs, we must then inquire whether these
SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 2.
“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801.
71 Consider this simplified example: A witness says, “I heard Mr. Jones say
that the defendant killed Mr. Smith.” That is a hearsay statement. If Mr.
Jones is not in the courtroom, he is not observable by the jury and
unavailable by the defense for cross examination. Hearsay is generally
excluded to support the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against
him and to keep unreliable and unverified statements at bay. See Adam
Freedman, What is Hearsay?, QUICK AND DIRTY TIPS (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.quickanddirtytips.com/business-career/legal/what-hearsay.
72 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24). These subdivisions are not excluded by the
rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a
witness.
73 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
74 Id.
75 See Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 303 (1973).
76 See Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the
Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 717, 724 n.29 (2015).
69
70
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beliefs are correct, thereby rendering the rules fair and
most effective to administering every proceeding fairly.77
Rule 609 is a rule for impeachment purposes and
uses a witness’s prior conviction as evidence that the
witness is unreliable.78 Impeachment evidence is
“evidence that may be used to impeach a witness because
it tends to harm the witness’s credibility.”79 Anyone who
takes the stand can be subject to impeachment.80 By
contrast to the cognitive theory of the “excited utterance”
hearsay exception, Rule 609 theory is that a person who
has been convicted of a crime can be inferred to have a
character for untruthfulness, and the factfinder is
welcome to infer that such a person might be lying on the
witness stand when he testifies.81 The law once
considered criminal defendants to be the “most likely liars
of all”82 and excluded them entirely from testifying.
Today, Rule 609 asserts that someone convicted has a
blemished record and therefore is less credible than
someone with no criminal record at all. In other words,
Rule 609 asserts that if the defendant was so antisocial to
have been convicted of a crime previously, it is probative
of his willingness to give false testimony on the stand
today.83 Theoretically, the evidence of a person’s prior
conviction is necessary because the jury deserves to know
whether the witness is an upstanding citizen and worthy
of belief.84 So, the evidence of a person’s prior conviction is
outside of Rule 404’s propensity ban. Instead, when
evidence of the witness’s prior conviction is introduced,
the jury is expected to psychologically exclude it for use as
character propensity (to determine whether the defendant
acted according to his character on a particular occassion)
See generally FED. R. EVID. 102 (discussing the rule’s purpose).
A witness could be called to testify on behalf of the Accused or be the
Accused himself. When the Accused testifies on his behalf he is known as the
witness-defendant. This paper focuses on the experiences of the witnessdefendant.
79 Impeachment evidence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (Updated
ed. 2011).
80 FED. R. EVID. 607 (“Any party, including the party who called the witness,
may attack the witness’s credibility.”).
81 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 169.
82 George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 662
(2006).
83 GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY, AND AUTHORITY 378 (LexisNexis
7th ed. 2012).
84 See Gold, supra note 14, at 2298.
77
78
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and use that evidence for its proper purpose (to determine
witness credibility).
The problem with this theory is that it ignores the
twin problems of juror misuse of evidence and implicit
bias. Rule 609’s policy assumes that the law today
coexists in a post-racial and beyond-race society.85 History
tells us this is simply not true. At common law, a felon
was deemed incompetent to testify as a witness.86 The
idea was that the felon, in addition to being punished for
the crime committed, was disqualified from testifying
because felons were “unworthy of belief.”87 Today, felons
may not be automatically disqualified from testifying, but
if they so choose to testify, they may be impeached when
the prosecutor introduces evidence of their prior
conviction.88 Indeed, it matters that the law has evolved
beyond the original blanket disqualification under the
common law.
In the United States, race has always been used as
predictive character evidence. As one scholar has so
strikingly noted: race is evidence.89 American slavery and
the segregation of Blacks from whites made clear that
one’s race was the sole determining factor for one’s place
in society. During the slavery era, when a person was
evidently Black, it was reasonable to legally assume they
were a slave—skin color had probative value.90
Additionally, being Black bore the presumption of bad
character when race determined the severity of penalties
that Blacks received in the criminal justice system.91
Certain crimes were designated as capital offenses if the
defendant was Black,92 and race could be used to
determine intent if the defendant was Black in rape
prosecutions after the Civil War.93 Additionally, under the
United States slave codes and competency requirements,
See Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets
Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 149, 151 (2014).
86 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989).
87 Id. (internal citation omitted).
88 Okun, supra note 13, at 538 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467
(1917) (holding common law rule disqualifying convicted felons from
testifying is inapplicable for determining witness competency)).
89 Carodine, supra note 62, at 528.
90 Id. at 531.
91 Id.
92 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV.
1945, 1955 (1993).
93 Carodine, supra note 62, at 532.
85
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Blacks were not able to testify against whites.94 The
ability of Blacks to testify is also directly correlated to
their ability to sit on juries.95 Congress first addressed the
issue of allowing Blacks the right to serve on juries in
1867.96 Proponents of that bill believed that the right to
serve as a juror was a natural evolution in the process for
newly freed men; opponents believed that Blacks did not
possess the ability to try cases fairly and accurately.97
To reinforce the stereotypes that Blacks are inferior
to whites, slave owners and legislators stimulated
misconceptions that Blacks, especially Black men, are
lazy, violent, and ignorant.98 Rule 401 states that
evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”99 Plainly, does the evidence have any tendency to
make the fact more or less likely than it would without
the evidence? It is a loose, porous standard. That someone
is of a particular race should not make it more or less
likely that they committed the crime charged or will be
untruthful upon testifying.100 Race evidence, while
inadmissible, still seeps in to the jury decision making
process via Rule 609. Historically, race had and has
evidentiary value and relevance because it is used to
make the determination that an act did occur simply
because the actor is Black.101
II.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE PARTNERSHIP

The stereotypes about Black males that dominate
American culture naturally find their way into the
courtroom. Proponents of post-racialism point to the
election of Barack Obama, the country’s first Black
president, to advance the argument that race is no longer

James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE
L.J. 895, 910 (2004).
95 Id. at 912.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 912–13.
98 Carodine, supra note 62, at 532.
99 FED. R. EVID. 401.
100 Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2264 (2017).
101 Carodine, supra note 62, at 531.
94
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salient to social analysis.102 But there exists a disparity
that too often is left unaddressed: a post-racial society
still exists when Blacks are disproportionately more
incarcerated than any other demographic of people.103
Even though America had a Black president, race still
matters.104 Critical Race Theory (CRT) has developed out
of legal scholarship and focuses on critically analyzing
race and racism from a legal point of view.105 Emerging in
the 1980s, CRT has become one of the fastest growing and
most controversial movements in recent legal
scholarship.106 CRT can be summarized as addressing
how assumptions about race affect the players within the
legal system and have a determining effect on substantive
legal doctrines.107 CRT rests on ten “commitments” or
themes, which are outlined as follows:
1. Race inequality is hardwired into the fabric
of our social and economic landscape.
2. Because racism exists at both the
subconscious and conscious levels, the
elimination of intentional racism would not
eliminate racial inequality.
3. Racism intersects with other forms of
inequality, such as classism, sexism, and
homophobia.
4. Our racial past exerts contemporary effects.
5. Racial change occurs when the interests of
white elites converge with the interests of
the racially disempowered.
6. Race is a social construction whose meanings
and effects are contingent and change over
time.
7. The concept of color blindness in law and
social policy and the argument for ostensibly

See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 85, at 152.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010) (“[I]n major cities wracked by the drug
war, as many as eighty percent of young African American men now have
criminal records and are thus subject to legalized discrimination for the rest
of their lives.”).
104 See Carodine, supra note 62, at 523.
105 What is Critical Race Theory?, UCLA SCH. PUB. AFF. BLOG,
https://spacrs.wordpress.com/what-is-critical-race-theory/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2018).
106 Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 503 (1997).
107 Id. at 503–04.
102
103
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race-neutral practices often serve to
undermine the interests of people of color.
8. Immigration laws that restrict Asian and
Mexican entry into the United States
regulate the racial makeup of the nation and
perpetuate the view that people of Asian and
Latino descent are foreigners.
9. Racial stereotypes are ubiquitous in society
and limit the opportunities of people of color.
10. The success of various policy initiatives often
depends on whether the perceived
beneficiaries are people of color.108
These commitments and the work of CRT scholars
demonstrate that American society is not “post-racial.”
CRT has been praised for its ability to consider multiple
perspectives in legal scholarship, and its ability to bring
to light the everyday acts of racism that are extremely
subtle and difficult to regulate by law.109 CRT is also
highly regarded for incorporating and giving a voice to
those who are underrepresented and experience injustice
in the legal system: minorities, women, criminals, the
poor, and jurors.110 Likewise, “Human Centered Civil
Justice is rooted in human experience, needs, beliefs,
concerns and the adversities that people encounter in the
everyday.”111 To better understand how members of the
public encounter and experience the civil justice system,
“civil justice designers draw on psychological science
concerning both procedural justice and distributive
justice.”112
One example of how the public experiences the
justice system is through over-policing of Black
communities. Racial bias is partly responsible for why
Blacks are treated more harshly than whites and
contributes to why Black males have greater interaction
with law enforcement. However, racial bias has not
always been linked to treating individuals as if they are

Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 151.
Litowitz, supra note 106, at 510.
110 Id. at 511.
111 Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PENN ST.
L. REV. 745, 772 (2017).
112 Id.
108
109
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older than they are.113 In a study on the police and racial
bias, Dr. Philip Goff showed that white police officers are
more likely to use force against Black children when
officers dehumanize Blacks.114 Dr. Goff and his colleagues
explored the possibility that “if human childhood affords
strong protections against harsh, adult-like treatment,
then in contexts where children are dehumanized, those
children can be treated with adult severity.”115 In one of
four studies to test previously established hypotheses,
Goff tested 60 police officers116, mostly white males with
an average age of thirty-eight, to determine whether
dehumanization of Blacks leads to worse outcomes in the
criminal justice system.117 First, officers were given a
“dehumanization” implicit association test (IAT) to
measure the form of their implicit bias against Blacks
consisting of Black/White, ape/great cat pairings.118
Afterwards, the officers were presented with 12 scenarios
depicting male targets of a given race (White, Black or
Latino) as criminal suspects.119 Researchers then
reviewed the police officers’ personnel files to determine
when these officers used force while on duty.120 After
adding weights to each “incident” of force based on its
severity121, results revealed that officers overestimated
the age of Black felony suspects more than that of Black
misdemeanor suspects, as well as all other suspects.122
The police officers who dehumanized Blacks (associated
Blacks with apes) were more likely to have used force
against a Black child than those officers who did not
dehumanize Blacks.123 White children were not subject to

Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Jackson, Brooke Di Leone, Carmen Culotta &
Natalie DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 526 (2014).
114 Id. at 527.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 535. After the shocking results of this study, Dr. Goff sought to
replicate the field component with a larger sample. The results were virtually
the same.
117 Id. at 533.
118 Id. at 531.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. Researchers multiplied each incident by a number representing the
severity of the force used. Wrist locks were multiplied by 1, punching 2, and
so on up to 8 for the use of deadly force.
122 Id. at 534.
123 Id. at 535.
113
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this overestimation.124 Further, the research from this
study indicated that only dehumanization, not prejudice
against Blacks, was linked to violent encounters with
Black children.125 The next logical question is what causes
white police officers to dehumanize Black children?
Perception matters with age and culpability. Dr.
Goff also determined that there is a reduction in
perceiving Black children as the children they are.126
Overestimating age and culpability based on racial
differences was linked to the dehumanizing stereotypes
found in the first portion of the study.127 In another study
involving participants outside the criminal-justice
context, a group of undergraduate students consisting of
mostly white females were asked to rate innocence from
photos of children in infancy through age twenty-five.128
Beginning at age ten, Black children were rated
significantly less innocent than white children and their
ages were overestimated by an average of four-and-a-half
years.129 Dr. Goff’s work is just one example of scientific
evidence of racial disparities, but his evidence clearly
shows that perception of child innocence can be affected
by race. For Black children, this can mean that they lose
assumed childhood innocence well before they become
adults.130 The research from this study indicates that
Black children are more likely to be perceived as
dangerous, aggressive, and less innocent “at an age when
white boys still benefit from the presumption that
children are essentially innocent.”131 When Black children
are considered older (by four-and-a-half years) and more
culpable than they are in reality, a mere thirteen-year-old
child is perceived to be an adult. More importantly, Black
males have more encounters with police earlier in life
than their white counterparts.132
Id.
Id.
126 Id. at 532.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 529.
129 Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Black Boys Viewed as Older, Less
Innocent than Whites, Research Finds (Mar. 6, 2014)
(https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/03/black-boys-older.aspx).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See generally Radley Balko, Opinion, There’s overwhelming evidence that
the criminal-justice system is racist. Here’s the proof., WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres124
125
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In terms of minorities and Rule 609, the problem is
not simply that crime has been racialized (when we think
of crime, we have Blacks in mind); it is also that race is
criminalized (when we think of Blacks, we have crime in
mind).133 Researchers have concluded that blackness
essentially primes us to think about crime, and in turn,
crime primes us to pay close attention to Black people.134
As seen in the studies conducted by Dr. Goff, crime has
been racialized for Black youth who have more exposure
to the criminal system than other demographics.
Therefore, if the prototypical criminal is a Black person
and Black identity has become associated with
criminality, it follows that racial suspicion shapes
behavior in the world: whether it be the behavior of law
enforcement, decision-making juries, or policy-making
legislators.135 Recall that the theory underlying Rule 609
is that a jury might be misled to think the defendant is
trustworthy without Rule 609 as an impeachment
method. Rule 609 assumes that in addition to whatever
else law breaking may tell the court about a witness, it
reveals that the witness has a substantially increased
likelihood of telling lies.136 The misperception problem
with prior convictions works in the opposite direction with
white defendants and witnesses as well. “If a White
defendant or a White witness does not have a prior record,
the jury will assume that person has led an honorable life
and is worthy of belief.”137 “White credit”138 in the
criminal-justice system works favorably for white
defendants who will likely be viewed differently from a
Black defendant who has had numerous run-ins with the
law.139

overwhelming-evidence-that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-theproof/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b557235ced8b (discussing and providing
information from several studies regarding racial injustice such as over
policing of minority communities).
133 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 152.
134 Id. (“[S]eeing blackness makes a participant more attuned to
criminality.”).
135 Id. at 153.
136 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 168.
137 Carodine, supra note 62, at 560.
138 Id. Carodine describes “white credit” as a corollary to the “black tax”
where white criminal defendants enjoy an undeserved benefit from being
White because the face of crime in America is decidedly Black.
139 Carodine, supra note 62, at 560.
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What begins to happen next in the courtroom,
underscoring blackness as criminal, is that Black criminal
defendants become subject to use of their prior convictions
as character propensity. In other words, instead of the
jury using the prior conviction to assist them exclusively
in assessing credibility, jurors often draw the inference
that a person who commits a crime has a criminal
character and is therefore more likely to be guilty of the
crime charged.140 As has already been discussed,
character evidence is generally inadmissible.141 But when
jurors look at a Black defendant and rely on their
available heuristics (mental shortcuts that help people
make mental assessments), race comes to mind.142
Further, popular discourse makes it easier for people to
retrieve examples of African Americans as criminals.143 It
is for these reasons that defendants with prior convictions
will often not take the stand. Rule 609 can only be
triggered if the witness takes the stand; if there is no
witness, then impeachment cannot be satisfied.144 Rule
609 creates substantial risk for the defendant to take the
stand on his own behalf if he has prior convictions that
the prosecution could introduce to the jury.145 Moreover,
the jury may still draw a negative inference from a
defendant’s silence.146 Sadly, a large number of factually
innocent defendants with prior convictions have sat
silently through trial before being found guilty.147
As discussed, it has become quite doubtful that
jurors are able to restrict their use of prior conviction
evidence to assess a witness’s credibility only. To
undercut this challenging psychological process, courts
may even instruct jurors to use the evidence solely to
evaluate credibility.148 Unfortunately, research shows
these instructions do little to prevent jurors from walking
down the forbidden path of using prior-crimes evidence to
SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 168.
See generally Okun, supra note 13, for a discussion and the text of FED. R.
EVID. 404.
142 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 153.
143 Id.
144 FED. R. EVID. 607 (“Any party, including the party who called the witness,
may attack the witness’s credibility.”).
145 Dodson, supra note 23, at 46–47.
146 Gold, supra note 14, at 2314-15.
147 Roberts, supra note 17, at 575.
148 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 169.
140
141
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make inferences about the crime charged.149 The research
in favor of excluding prior conviction evidence suggests
that prior-conviction evidence contributes little or nothing
to the credibility assessment of defendants who take the
witness stand, and it creates the risk that jurors will
draw improper propensity inferences.150 Additional
research shows that while the American jurisprudence
system places a great deal of trust in the job of the jury,
the average juror does little better than chance at reliably
detecting truth telling!151 Further, the impeachment by
prior conviction regime fails to take account for disparities
in law enforcement, the growing body of data on wrongful
convictions, and the nature and dominance of plea
bargaining—all of which challenge the theory that priorconviction evidence is a reliable indicator of character for
truthfulness.152 Therefore, evidence of prior convictions
prejudices the Accused from taking the stand in his or her
own defense and increases the Accused’s chances of being
convicted again.153 Rule 609 creates dangerous risks that
improper propensity inferences will be used by the jury.154
To make matters worse, if the Accused sees testifying as
too risky, he will likely seek a plea bargain.155 The
Accused’s own testimony, possibly the most viable line of
defense, is gone. This alliance between prior conviction
evidence and the plea bargain minimizes public reform of
the criminal justice system and perpetuates the systemic
racism already embedded within it.156 Defendants quickly
lose the established presumption of innocence when they
don’t take the stand, increasing the chances of
reconviction without consideration of culpability.157

See generally Renee McDonald Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth!
Trial Juries and Credibility, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 505 (2014); Max
Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2557 (2008).
150 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 168.
151 See Hutchins, supra note 142, at 526 n.84.
152 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 563–64.
153 See Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision
Making, 11 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 269, 279 (2015).
154 See Hornstein, supra note 22, at 4, n.11.
155 Roberts, supra note 17, at 575.
156 Roberts, supra note 17, at 575.
157 Id. at 574.
149
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Evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction should
have one purpose: to assist in assessing credibility.158
Even with the current version of Rule 609, courts still
struggle to apply the rule and there is disagreement about
which crimes are usable for this purpose.159 For example,
under Rule 609(a)(1)(B), most circuits have settled on the
five-prong balancing test established in the late 1960s
from Gordon v. United States.160 Despite this test, the
application of the factors is fraught with inconsistency
when determining the probative value of the prior
conviction against the prejudicial effect.161 One factor,
“the similarity between the past crime and the crime
charged,” is derived from early case law that regarded
“similarity” as a factor that discouraged admissibility
because it increased the risk that the conviction would be
considered relevant to the defendant’s propensity to
commit the crime charged rather than the defendant’s
credibility.162 But some subsequent caselaw favors the
admissibility of a similar crime.163 These “confusions”
often do lead to admissibility of prior crimes evidence, and
this evidence is often upheld by appellate courts further
supporting the racial disparities of the criminal justice
system.164
III.

RULE 609 PERPETUATES THE CYCLE OF RACISM IN
THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM

The consideration that Rule 609 is neutral becomes
questionable when juxtaposed against the backdrop of
racism and criminalization in the history of America.
Blacks are more likely to have their cars searched, to be
arrested for drug use, to be jailed while awaiting trial, to
be offered a plea deal that includes prison time, to be
excluded from juries because of their race, to serve longer
sentences than other ethnic groups for the same offense,

See Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 270 (1973).
159 Id.
160 See Roberts supra note 17, at 569.
161 Id.
162 Roberts, supra note 17, at 570.
163 Id.
164 Id.
158
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and to have their probation revoked.165 Recent statistics
show that nearly half of inmates in state or federal
prisons and local jails are non-Hispanic Blacks.166 In
terms of raw numbers, there are more than two-million
Blacks in prison or jail on any given day.167
Commentators have offered various theories explaining
the disproportionate number of incarcerated Blacks,
including: the “over-policing” of Black communities, the
War on Drugs (which unfairly targets minorities),
prosecutorial bias, and other flaws and biases in the trial
process that result in Blacks receiving harsher treatment
than whites and innocent minority defendants being
convicted.168 These aforementioned theories contradict the
notion that Blacks are simply more prone to committing
crimes. To the contrary, Blacks are more prone to being
swept up in a criminal justice system that is, in many
respects, hostile to and biased against them.169 “Once a
Black person is convicted of a crime (a likely scenario
given the current statistics), that conviction will help to
convict him again if he is ever charged with another crime
(another very likely outcome given the “repeat offender”
statistics for Blacks)” under the impeachment with prior
convictions regime.170 Rule 609 perpetuates the
criminalization of the Black population.171
For the last several decades, critical race theorists
have argued that Blacks do not receive the benefit from
the presumption of innocence.172 Bryan Stevenson goes so
far as to say that Black children are born with a
presumption of guilt.173 In the few times the Supreme
Court has used social science in its decisions, the outcome
Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to be Black in the Criminal
Justice System, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/08/racial_disparit
ies_in_the_criminal_justice_system_eight_charts_illustrating.html (outlining
how Blacks experience the criminal-justice system).
166 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP.ORG, http://www.naacp.org/criminaljustice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2018).
167 Id.
168 The Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights, PRISONERHEALTH.ORG,
https://www.prisonerhealth.org/educational-resources/factsheets-2/race-andincarceration/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
169 Carodine, supra note 62, at 526.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 152.
173 Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 7, 2017),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/07/13/presumption-of-guilt/.
165
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was quite favorable for race relations. The Supreme
Court, in its landmark Brown v. Board of Education
decision, cited the work of Black psychologists Kenneth
Clark and Mamie Clark.174 Drs. Kenneth and Mamie
Clark, a husband and wife duo, conducted a series of
experiments known as “The Doll Test” in the 1940s.175
Their subjects, children between the ages of three to
seven, were asked to identify both the race of the dolls
and which color doll they prefer.176 A majority of the
children preferred the white doll and assigned positive
characteristics to it.177 In an effort to leverage the
outcome of these experiments, the Brown legal team
relied on the testimonies and research of social scientists
as a part of their legal strategy.178 This research proved
fruitful when the Court held that state laws designating
separate public schools for Black and white children were
unconstitutional.179 The results of The Doll Test
empirically proved that prejudice, segregation, and
discrimination created inferiority among Black children
and damaged their self-esteem.180 Through Brown, social
science research remarkably contributed to one of the
most important court decisions in twentieth-century
America.181
A more recent study from 2004 shows a similar
effect to the one the Clarks discovered over sixty years
ago, where researchers investigated the relationship
between stereotypical associations and visual
processing.182 Researchers primed participants with
images of either Black or white male faces, then showed
objects on a computer screen that were either crime
See Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. & Ellen M. Crouse, The American Psychological
Association's Response to Brown v. Board of Education: The Case of Kenneth
B. Clark, 57 AM. PSYCHOL. 38, 40–41 (2002).
175 NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, The Significance of “The Doll Test,”
http://www.naacpldf.org/brown-at-60-the-doll-test (last visited Jan. 1, 2018).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (holding that
segregation of white and black children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the black children).
180 See Charles J. Olgetree, Jr., The Significance of Brown, 20 Harv.
Blackletter L.J. 1, 5 (2004).
181 See Dodson, supra note 23, at 40.
182 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G.
Davies, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004).
174
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relevant (a gun) or irrelevant (a camera).183 The images
were initially degraded, then slowly enhanced to discern
what the image was.184 Researchers measured the time it
took to identify the object based on what racial prime was
provided at the beginning of the test.185 As expected,
Black face primes dramatically reduced the number of
frames needed to accurately detect crime relevant
objects.186 In other words, when participants were primed
with the faces of Black males, they identified crimerelated objects faster than objects not associated with
crime.187 In the criminal context, the study proves that
police officers also think about crime when they see Black
people and are likely to be more attentive to them.188 And
taking this one step further, this means the presence of
Black people means law enforcement is more likely to be
attentive to the possibility of crime.
Professor Carodine189 has noted the varieties of
racism that exist to support the theory that criminality
based on race is “reasonable”190: “Negrophobia” is
described as a form of post-traumatic stress that a person
encounters after a traumatic experience with a Black
person, “The Reasonable Racist” is someone who believes
that it is reasonable to believe that Blacks are more likely
to commit crime because other similarly situated
Americans would believe this to be true as well, and the
“Involuntary Negrophobe” is a person who has developed
a phobia towards all Blacks.191 What these figures have in
common is that they represent the various perceptions of
Black Americans and reduce the reliability of criminal
convictions.192 Racism is inherently unreliable.193
For example, social science data has proven the
existence of crossracial impairment. Cross-racial
identification occurs when an eyewitness is asked to

Id. at 879.
Id.
185 Id. at 880.
186 Id.
187 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 152.
188Id.
189 See supra note 62 for the text of this author’s work being referenced.
190 Carodine, supra note 62, at 578.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 579.
193 Id.
183
184
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identify a person of another race.194 In the New Jersey
Supreme Court case, State v. Cromedy, the victim was
raped and robbed in her home.195 The attacker made no
attempt to conceal his face, and the victim believed she
saw his face clearly in the brightly lit apartment.196
Approximately eight months later, the victim saw a Black
male across the street who she believed was her
attacker.197 Citing Brown v. Board of Education and
relying on a plethora of social-science research, the court
had to determine whether cross-racial impairment of
eyewitnesses was a scientifically accepted fact.198 The
court held that not only does this impairment exist, it is
strongest when white witnesses attempt to recognize
Black subjects.199 The court rejected the State’s contention
that it should not require a cross-racial identification
charge to the jury before it has been demonstrated that
there is substantial agreement in the relevant scientific
community to support such a charge.200 It was
demonstrated that there was substantial agreement in
the relevant scientific community that cross-racial
recognition impairment exists, and that therefore Mr.
Cromedy was entitled to a jury instruction apprising
jurors of that fact.201 Even if there were no such
agreement, the court concluded that empirical data
indicated that problems with cross-racial exist as a
matter of ordinary human experience not scientific
knowledge.202 State v. Cromedy represents an instance
were identification of the defendant was the critical
issue.203 Mr. Cromedy, was wrongfully convicted even
after the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded for a new
trial.204 His case also represents yet another wrinkle to
the existence of racial disparity in the criminal justice
Aaron H. Chiu, “We Can’t Tell Them Apart”: When and How the Court
Should Educate Jurors on the Potential Inaccuracies of Cross-Racial
Identifications, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 415, 416
(2008).
195 State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1999).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 463.
199 Id. at 462.
200 Id. at 466.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 467.
203 Id. at 465.
204 Chiu, supra note 198, at 415.
194
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system. While many scholars support the idea of
including expert testimony to educate jurors on crossracial identification, few trial judges permit this.205
Instead, special jury instructions are employed but again
those cannot be relied upon as a safeguard for
defendants.206
In lieu of these challenging perspectives, there are
a few states trying to do it right, like Montana, Hawaii,
and Georgia for example. In State v. Maine, the Montana
Supreme Court diverged from United States Supreme
Court precedent and ruled that a prior conviction cannot
be used to increase the punishment for a subsequent
offense if the prior conviction is tainted by any kind of
constitutional violation.207 Indeed, a defendant whose
sentence is enhanced based on an unreliable prior
conviction is made to suffer punishment twice for a
conviction that was not reliable enough to punish him the
first time.208 Hawaii was the first state to adopt a version
of Rule 609 that departed from the federal rule by
disallowing the use of a prior-conviction to impeach a
criminal defendant.209 Hawaii’s Supreme Court showed
concern that prior convictions have little probative value
on witness credibility and ruled such impeachment
unconstitutional under its state constitution.210 Likewise
in United States v. Leviner,211 Judge Nancy Gertner of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
declined to accept the presumptive weight of Mr.
Leviner’s prior convictions for sentencing purposes and
instead examined the circumstances of the convictions.212
In this case specifically, the prior convictions left the
Judge feeling concerned that the convictions had been a
product of racial profiling.213 She sentenced the defendant
as if these prior convictions did not exist.214 Judge
Gertner sets the standard at the federal level for the way
Id. at 421.
Dodson, supra note 23, at 15.
207 Paul M. Leisher, Examining Montana's Right to Attack Unconstitutional
Prior Convictions at Sentencing: State v. Maine, 74 MONT. L. REV. 183, 183
(2013).
208 Id. at 184.
209 Dodson, supra note 23, at 14.
210 Id.
211 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D. Mass. 1998).
212 Gold, supra note 14, at 565–66.
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in which prior conviction evidence should be identified
and assessed: she refused to compound injustice.
CONCLUSION
Use of prior convictions is unreliable. The fact that
Black people are more likely than whites to have a
criminal record and be impeached with their prior
convictions compounds the unreliability problem. As one
scholar has noted, support for the disparate treatment of
Blacks affects jury decision making and creates due
process concerns.215 While due process is beyond the scope
of this paper, it is important to underscore that use of
prior convictions, as proof of the defendant’s character for
veracity, are not supported by social-science research. As
Judge Easterbrook noted several decades ago, “[W]e do
not pretend that a jury can keep one inference in mind
without thinking about the other.”216
The use of prior convictions also stands on the
assumption that the defendant’s prior conviction was
vigorously tried the first time; thereby creating a vicious
cycle in which it is assumed the conviction was reliable to
begin with. This is not true for all defendants. Even
judges possess bias.217 With the compounding amount of
racial bias apparent in the criminal justice system, these
assumptions must be challenged, and social science has
and continues to do so. Study after study demonstrates
that Blacks are more likely to be targets of crime and to
be charged with crimes from adolescence through
adulthood.218 How can we continue to give a neutral face
to these inaccuracies?

Carodine, supra note 62, at 553.
United States v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 264 (7th Cir. 1986).
217 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Does Unconscious Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009) (noting that
judges harbor the same kind of implicit biases as others).
218 See generally Devon Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model
of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1485 (2016) (discussing in Part I
how repeated exposure to police violence derives from the disproportionate
contact Blacks have with police in the first place); see also Goff, supra note
113, at 536 (discussing how “[t]he results of Study 3b provide further
evidence that the implicit dehumanization of Black is related to Black
children’s disproportionate (as compared to their White peers) experiences of
violent encounters with police officers.
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This paper proposes that a federal task force be
developed to address Rule 609 and the implicit bias it
contains. Against the backdrop of historic racism, where
racial inequality has been hardwired into our culture,
Rule 609 needs an immediate facelift. First, Rule
609(a)(2) makes sense to allow crimes of dishonesty to be
automatically admissible because veracity of the witness
in a proceeding is important. However, even with Rule
609(a)(1)’s immediate admission of these specific
convictions, the court should thoroughly assess the record
to ensure—as states like Montana and Hawaii do—that
the prior conviction is not tainted by any sort of
constitutional violation. If so, the defense should be
entitled to object. In regard to Rule 609 in totality, racial
inequality in America urges a collaboration with CRT and
the social sciences to acknowledge that race is a social
construction whose meanings and effects change over
time. More specifically, Congress should seek to work
directly with social science to incorporate the work that
social scientists have already done and use humancentered design methods to acknowledge and reconfigure
the rule in such a manner that fulfills its purpose: the
administration of a fair proceeding and, ultimately, a fair
determination. By doing so, we create the potential that
rule drafters will respond appropriately to an everevolving racial landscape, that prosecutors will think
twice before introducing evidence of a prior conviction
that may not have been obtained fairly, that judges will
better screen and become introspective of their own
prejudices, and that defendant-witnesses will hold fast to
their defense of testifying on their own behalf without the
dreaded fear of being impeached. A swift and urgent
review of Rule 609 would begin to thwart the repetitious
cycle of racism in our criminal justice system and make
the next fight for a defendant fairer.
Many scholars have proposed a range of options for
Rule 609. Proposals include complete elimination of the
rule, consideration that courts and rule drafters take a
deeper look into prior convictions as reliable sources of
evidence, and advocacy for a complete turn toward a
critical race theory of evidence entirely.219 I do not believe
See Montré D. Carodine, The Mis-Characterization of the Negro: A Race
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 583-585
219
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the rule in its entirety should be eliminated, yet I do
agree that reliance on prior convictions has gone too far. I
believe implicit bias exists. I believe that any respected,
ethical judge and litigator knows that it exists even if
they do not understand its applicability to the law.
Incidents of racism often appear in the news and at least
64% of Americans believe racism remains a problem in
America. 220 So, we are beyond ignorance and
misunderstanding. As Professor Roberts has suggested,
the place to start is with the litigators of the system.221
My suggestion is to use the agreed-upon bias in the rule
among evidence scholars and social scientists to create a
platform of collaboration between legal scholars and social
scientists in order to reassess the operation of the rules
that present bias. If racial evidence is prohibited and
character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove that
a person is likely to behave a certain way, why does our
legal system allow prior convictions against people of color
who experience the criminal-justice system more than
anyone else? We know that jurors use race as a proxy for
character—and they should not. Because Rule 609 is
considered the most controversial of them all, a task force
to review Rule 609’s necessity with legal and CRT
scholars, social scientists, behavioral realists, and lay
people would certainly be a significant start.
Professor Jerry Kang has provided a model through
behavioral realism by which such a task force could begin
its review of Rule 609.222 Step one involves seeking more
accurate models of human behavior.223 This should not be
a difficult task because, as I have discussed infra, the
work of social scientists exists on a wide spectrum within
(2009) (proposing elimination of the use of prior convictions to impeach as an
unreliable form of hearsay; Jasmine Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race
Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2245 (2017) (proposing use of
CRT scholarship to spur conversation, train litigators, and apply fully to
evidence law); Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C.
L. REV., 563, 608 (2014) (proposing that judges be permitted to inquire into
the reliability of the conviction and, likewise, prosecutors inquire into
reliability of the conviction before proffering them as evidence).
220 Andrew Arnage, Stephanie Perry & Dartunorro Clark, Poll: 64 percent of
Americans say racism remains a major problem,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-64-percent-americanssay-racism-remains-major-problem-n877536 (last visited May 1, 20190.
221 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 608.
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law and in many areas of the criminal justice. Step two is
to excavate old law.224 Again, once new and accurate
models of human behavior and implicit bias are accounted
for in police and prosecutorial culture and training,
courtrooms, and juries, we may see a break in behavior.225
Step three account for the gap.226 Where there is a
sufficiently large gap between old law and new models of
behavior, we should pressure the law to take account.227
As it relates to Rule 609, I have discussed the ways in
which convictions offered for impeachment are prejudicial
and misrepresent a defendant-witness’s veracity for
truthfulness. Furthermore, the potential that jurors will
use that conviction evidence improperly burdens a
defendant’s rights to testify and proceeds under the
assumption that the defendant’s prior conviction was
vigorously defended, free of implicit bias, and is a reliable
indicator of his character for truthfulness. These
assumptions have and should be challenged. All we must
do is wait for the criminal justice system to reflect and
remove the seemingly insurmountable amount of racial
bias that Black defendants face within it. Such an effort,
to address the bias that is inherent in Rule 609, could be a
catalyst to promote new policies around discrimination in
legal proceedings overall to ensure that the Rules
preserve their purpose to “administer every proceeding
fairly” for everyone. A deeper collaboration with the social
sciences is not just necessary, it is imperative.
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